Leslieann Haacke (Glenn) v. Mark Mitchell Glenn : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Leslieann Haacke (Glenn) v. Mark Mitchell Glenn :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Mitchell Glenn; Pro Se.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon AND Williams; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





K F U 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LESLIEANN HAACKE (GLENN), 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs-
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Docket No. 900531-CA 
Priority Classification IH b 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ENTERED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 14, 1990 BY THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MARK MITCHELL GLENN 
Defendant Pro Se 
4878 South Highland Circle, #6 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 2 8 - 1 1 6 2 
FILED 
FEB 2 2 1991 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LESLIEANN HAACKK |l,l,M'lll| 
>c I I dill 
-vs-
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JU 
ENTERED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEJ 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RODNEY 
BRIEF OF 
DGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
EMBER 14, 1990 BY THE SECOND 
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF 
S. PAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
APPELLANT 
MARK MITCHELL GLENN 
Defendant Pro Se 
4878 South Highland Circle, 5 
Salt Lake City, Uta1 T ' -
Docket No. 900531-CA 
Priority Classification . J 
MARY C. CORPORON #7 34 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Appe I ! ,ini 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/ STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR AN ANNULMENT 4 
CONCLUSION 7 
APPENDICES iii 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Avnery v. Avnery, 375 N.y.S.2d 888 
Douglass v. Douglass, 307 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1957) 
Rules 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3. • 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-1-17.1. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(g). . 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LESLIEANN HAACKE (GLENN), 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Docket No. 900531-CA 
-vs-
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, Priority Classification |^b 
Defendant/Appellee. 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
ENTERED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 14, 1990 BY THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT to the above-captioned 
action, by and through counsel, and hereby submits the following 
as her appellate brief herein. 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Rule 3 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order denying 
plaintiff's complaint for a decree of annulment and granting 
plaintiff's complaint as a decree of divorce instead. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review in this appeal is: Did the 
lower court err in failing to grant plaintiff's complaint for 
annulment and in granting plaintiff a decree of divorce instead? 
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no case law authorities or statutory authorities 
or constitutional provisions believed by plaintiff/appellant to 
be wholly dispositive of the issue on appeal herein. The 
statutory authority which may be dispositive of the issue 
presented on appeal is Utah Code Annotated. Section 30-1-17.1, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached hereto, designated as 
"Appendix A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS / STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant and appellee participated in a marriage 
ceremony on December 16, 1989 in the City of Bountiful, County of 
Davis, State of Utah. (TR, p.l, 1.25 to p.2, 1.2) 
2. A complaint for divorce was filed by the appellant in 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State 
of Utah on September 5, 1990. (Attached hereto as "Appendix B") 
Thereafter, appellant filed an amended complaint for annulment. 
(Attached hereto as "Appendix C") The defendant/appellee entered 
into an Amended Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
(attached hereto as "Appendix D"), consenting to entry of a 
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decree of annulment as requested by plaintiff/appellant. 
3. The lower court, having heard the matter on September 
14, 1990, and after taking evidence, refused to grant the 
appellant an annulment and, instead, granted the appellant a 
divorce. A true and correct copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce entered by the Court are 
attached hereto, designated as "Appendix E" and "Appendix F," 
respectively, and incorporated herein by reference. 
4. Prior to and during the course of the parties' 
"marriage," the appellee made fraudulent misrepresentations to 
the appellant concerning his honesty, trustworthiness and lack of 
criminal involvement. More specifically, appellee deliberately 
and intentionally concealed from the appellant, prior to and 
during the parties' marriage, that he had been convicted of a 
second degree felony, theft of property, in the State of Alabama, 
his previous residence. Appellee represented to appellant that 
the purpose of his travels back and forth between Utah and 
Alabama was to take care of prior child support obligations, when 
in reality he was utilizing the parties' joint funds for payment 
of his fines and restitution attendant to his felony conviction. 
Appellant did not become aware of appellee's criminal record 
until she was approached by her employer, the Utah Department of 
Corrections, after the parties' "marriage." (TR, p.2, 1.24-
p.4, 1.1.) 
5. Appellant was at all times relevant an attorney for the 
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Inspector General's Division, and had unlimited access to 
criminal files and records, which created a severe conflict of 
interest between appellant's "marriage" and her employment. This 
situation also placed the appellant in violation of state policy 
and procedure and state statute (TR, p.3, 11.5-10) and, as a 
result, appellant was by a letter written by Gary W. DeLand, 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Corrections, dated 
September 4, 1990, that her employment with the Department would 
be terminated effective September 14, 1990. That letter also 
stated that if appellant's current circumstances were changed 
(i.e., if the marital relationship were terminated immediately 
and if her marriage were annulled or dissolved) the Department 
would consider her for re-employment. A true and correct copy of 
said letter is attached hereto, designated as "Appendix G" and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
6. Given appellant's field of employment, which is 
criminal investigations and justice, appellant's present and 
potential future employers (including, possibly, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation) will distinguish quite heavily between 
divorce and annulment due to the felon status of the appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LONER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
COMPLAINT FOR AN ANNULMENT. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-1-17.1, specifically states 
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that a marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes 
existing at the time of the marriage: (1) when the marriage is 
void under Chapter 1 of Title 30, or (2) upon grounds existing at 
common law. 
Concealment or misrepresentation of material facts are 
grounds for annulment of a marriage at common law. In Avnery v. 
Avnery, 375 N.Y.S. 2d 888, 890, the Court stated: 
In order to obtain an annulment on the ground of 
fraud, a plaintiff must establish fraud which is 
"'material, to that degree that, had it not been 
practiced, the party deceived would not have consented 
to the marriage', and is of such a nature as to deceive 
an ordinarily prudent person. (Citing DiLorenzo v. 
DiLorenzo, 67 N.E. 63, 64; Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 184 
N.E. 60,61; Kober v. Kober, 211 N.E.2d 817, 819.) 
(A true and correct copy of Avnery, is attached hereto, 
designated as "Appendix H.") 
In Douglass v. Douglass, 307 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1957), the wife 
filed a complaint for annulment. The Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County denied the annulment and the wife appealed. She 
alleged that she was induced into the marriage because her 
husband had falsely and fraudulently represented to her that he 
was a law abiding, respectable and honorable man and had 
concealed from her his real character. She relied upon these 
misrepresentations and otherwise would not have consented to the 
marriage. The husband in this case had concealed the fact that 
he was a convicted felon. Upon discovering these facts, the wife 
severed her relationship with the defendant and had not resided 
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with him since. The Court state that "the test in all cases is 
whether the false representations or concealment were such as to 
defeat the essential purpose of the injured spouse inherent in 
the contracting of a marriage." Id., at page 675. The Court 
also stated that a "party has a right to a decree of annulment 
where the fraud is so grievous that it places the injured party 
in a relationship that is intolerable because it cannot honorably 
be endured." Id., at page 676. The Court noted that the 
honorable character of a spouse, one whom the other spouse could 
respect and trust, and one whom she would be proud to have as a 
companion and to introduce to her friends, are the essentials of 
the marital relationship which the plaintiff expected and that 
"the fraud of the defendant in concealing his criminal record and 
true character was deceit so gross and cruel as to prove him to 
plaintiff to be a man unworthy of trust, either with respect to 
his truthfulness, his moral character or a disposition to be a 
law abiding citizen." Id., at page 676. A true and correct copy 
of Douglass is attached hereto, designated as "Appendix I." 
The facts in the case at hand are very similar to those in 
Douglass. The appellee here concealed from the appellant that he 
was a convicted felon. The appellant, being employed by the 
Department of Corrections as an attorney, was well aware of the 
fact that any involvement with a convicted felon would not only 
create a conflict of interest with her employer, but would lead 
to termination of her employment. Appellant relied upon the 
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representations of appellee that he was law abiding and truthful 
and would not have otherwise consented to marry him had she been 
informed of his prior conviction. Upon learning of appellee's 
criminal conviction, appellant immediately severed her 
relationship with the appellee. The type of concealment and 
misrepresentations by the husband in this case were egregious. 
Not only has this placed appellant's employment in jeopardy, but 
she has also lost the respect and confidence of her former co-
workers, as evidenced by the letter of Gary W. DeLand, dated 
October 23, 1990 which is attached hereto as "Appendix J." 
In order to minimize the injuries appellant has sustained as 
a result of this "marriage," a Decree of Annulment should be 
granted and all traces of this "marriage" should be erased as 
though the marriage never existed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the 
trial court erred in refusing to grant the wife a decree of 
annulment and instead granting a divorce, and should reverse the 
decision of the lower court to allow appellant to receive a 
decree of annulment. 
DATED THIS IH day of February, 1991. 
C0RP0R0N & WILLIAMS 
MARY C# CJRPORON 
Attorrpy for Plaintiff/Appellant 
7 ' 
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APPENDIX A 
30-1-17 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
History: R.S. 1898 A C.L. 1907, S 1197; 
C.L. 1917, i 2980; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-1-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§ 123 
52 Am J u r 2d Marriage C.J.S. — 55 C J S Marriage § 26 
Key Numbers. — Marriage <*=> 25(4) 
30-1-17. Action to determine validity of marriage — Judg-
ment of validity or annulment. 
When there is doubt as to the validity of a marriage, either party may, in a 
court of equity in a county where either party is domiciled, demand its avoid-
ance or affirmance, but when one of the parties was under the age of consent 
at the time of the marriage, the other party, being of proper age, shall have no 
such proceeding for that cause against the party under age The judgment in 
the action shall either declare the marriage valid or annulled and shall be 
conclusive upon all persons concerned with the marriage 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1214; 
C.L. 1917, § 3006; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-1-17; L. 1971, ch. 65, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Conciliation petition, 
filing as temporary bar to filing action for an-
nulment, § 30-3-16 7 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attorney's fees on annulment 
Extent of court's jurisdiction 
Necessity for annulment 
Attorney's fees on annulment. 
The wife in a suit for annulment of the mar-
riage is not entitled to an allowance of attor-
ney's fees, but the allowance of attorney fees 
for determination of custody and support of a 
child of the marriage is proper Jenkins v Jen-
kins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P 2d 262 (1944) 
Extent of court's jurisdiction. 
In a suit for divorce, in which the parties by 
consent litigated various issues involved in a 
suit for annulment, although the pleadings did 
not state a cause of action for an annulment, 
the court, after granting the annulment, cor 
rectly proceeded to determine incidental issues 
concerning the division of the property and 
care and custody of the children Jenkins v 
Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P 2d 262 (1944), 
and cases cited therein 
Necessity for annulment. 
Where a purported marriage is void, there 
are neither grounds nor necessity for a divorce, 
however, it is proper for the good of society and 
the peace of mind of the persons concerned that 
void marriage be so declared by decree of the 
court Jenkins v Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 
P2d 262 (1944) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am Ju r 2d Annulment of 
Marriage § 1 et seq 
C.J.S. — 55 C J S Marriage §§ 48-69 
A.L.R. — Power of incompetent spouse's, 
guardian, committee or next friend, to sue for 
granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of 
marriage, or to make a compromise or settle-
ment in such suit, 6 A L R 3d 681 
Dismissal right of one spouse, over objec-
tion, to voluntarily dismiss claim for divorce, 
annulment, or similar material relief, 16 
A L R 3d 283 
Costs right of indigent to proceed in marital 
action without payment of costs, 52 A L R 3d 
844 
Attorney's fees in matters involving domes-
tic relations, amount of, 59 A L R 3d 152 
Prior institution of annulment proceedings 
or other attack on validity of one's marriage as 
barring or estopping one from entitlement to 
property rights as surviving spouse, 31 
A L R 4 t h 1190 
Key Numbers. — Marriage «=» 56 67 
414 
MARRIAGE 30-1-17.2 
30-1-17.1. Annulment — Grounds for. 
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the 
time of marriage 
(1) When the marriage is prohibited or void under Chapter 1 of Title 
30 
(2) Upon grounds existing at common law 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.1, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 65, <> 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am J u r 2d - 4 Am Ju r 2d Annulment of 
Marriage <rt 3 42 
C.J.S. - 55 C J S Marriage * 50 
A.L.R. — Concealment of or misrepresenta 
tion as to prior marital status as ground for 
annulment of marriage, 15 A L R 3d 759 
Religion concealment or misrepresentation 
relating to religion as ground for annulment, 
44 A L R 3d 972 
Identity what constitutes mistake in the 
identity of one of the parties to warrant annul-
ment of marriage, 50 A L R 3d 1295 
Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground 
for annulment, 52 A L R 3d 589 
Finances spouse's secret intention not to 
abide by written antenuptial agreement relat-
ing to financial matters as ground for annul-
ment, 66 A L R 3d 1282 
Validity of marriage as affected by lack of 
legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13 
A L R 4 t h 1323 
Key Numbers . — Marriage «=» 58 
30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage — Or-
ders relating to parties, property and children — 
Legitimacy of children. 
If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations 
subsequent to the marriage, or there is a genuine need arising from economic 
change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if there are children born, or 
expected, the court may make temporary and final orders, and subsequently 
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, the 
children and their custody and visitation, and the support and maintenance of 
the parties and children, as may be equitable The children born to the parties 
after the date of the marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both 
of the parties for all purposes 
History: C. 1953, 30-] 
1971, ch. 65, § 3 | a |. 
•17.2, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Nunc pro tunc entry 
of orders, § 30 4a 1 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Lord Mansfield rule 
Settlement 
Lord Mansfield rule. 
The Lord Mansfield Rule, whereby spouses 
may not give testimony which would tend to 
^legitimatize child born to wife during the 
marriage, was adopted Lopes v Lopes, 30 
Utah 2d 393, 518 P 2d 687 (1974) 
Sett lement. 
Court which granted annulment had author-
ity to grant wife a $1,200 settlement to enable 
her and her son by a prior marriage to return 
to her native Thailand Maple v Maple, 566 
P 2 d 1229 (Utah 1977) 
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APPENDIX B 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (3668) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
: : J : * . T 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 




MARK MITCHELL GLENN, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE 
c i v i l NO. 9^014940^ Df\ 
+ & 15.00 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff and for cause of action against 
Defendant alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action an actual and 
bona fide resident of Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on the 16th day of December, 1989, in Bountiful, Davis 
County, Utah. 
3. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have developed between the parties, to the degree that 
continuation of the marriage relationship is impossible. 
4. The parties maintained their marital domicile in 
Davis County, State of Utah, and the acts complained of by 
Plaintiff herein occurred in Davis County, State of Utah. ftUtffl 
5. There have no children born to Plaintiff and 
Defendant as issue of this marriage. Plaintiff is pregnant at the 
present time and is not expected to deliver the child of these 
parties until April or May, 1991. 
6. It is reasonable and proper that child support, 
visitation and other such issues be determined at the time of the 
birth of the child. 
7. It is reasonable and proper that reasonable alimony 
should be awarded in this matter. 
8. It is reasonable and proper that all of the 
possessions of the parties should be equitably divided by the 
Court. 
9. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
incurred debts and obligations. It is reasonable and proper that 
said debts and obligations should be equitably divided by the 
Court. 
10. It is reasonable and proper that in the final Decree 
in this matter each party should be ordered to sign all papers, 
documents, titles, deeds and any other document necessary to effect 
any of the provisions of the Decree including but not limited to 
the transfer of real or personal property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
as follows: 
1. For a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final 
upon entry in the register of action. 
2. For the said Decree to be granted in accordance with 
the Complaint for Divorce as set forth above. 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 1990. 
D. ftlCHAEL NIELSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPENDIX C 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (3668) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIEANN GLENN, : 
Plaintiff, : AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FOR ANNULMENT 
vs. : 
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, : Civil No. 900748406DA 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff and for cause of action against 
Defendant alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action an actual and 
bona fide resident of Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on the 16th day of December, 1989, in Bountiful, Davis 
County, Utah. 
3. The parties maintained their marital domicile in 
Davis County, State of Utah, and the acts complained of by 
Plaintiff herein occurred in Davis County, State of Utah. 
4. There have no children born to Plaintiff and 
Defendant as issue of this marriage and none are expected. 
Plaintiff was previously informed that she was pregnant, but upon 
further verification, it has been discovered that Plaintiff has 
either miscarried or that the original prognosis was incorrect. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. That the marriage of the above-entitled parties 
should be declared null and void pursuant to the terms of Section 
30-1-17.1(2), Utah Code Annotated, in that prior to the marriage, 
Defendant did make fraudulent misrepresentations concerning his 
honesty, trustworthiness and lack of criminal involvement. 
Defendant failed to inform Plaintiff that he had been convicted of 
a felony in the state of his previous residence, Alabama; he 
informed Plaintiff that he was traveling to Alabama to take care of 
prior child support obligations and problems, when in reality he 
was utilizing the funds of these parties for payment of fines and 
restitution, and he failed to inform Plaintiff of his prior 
criminal activity, much to Plaintiff's detriment in the^ form of 
loss of her employment with the State of Utah, Department of 
Corrections. 
6. Defendant's misrepresentations about his lack of 
criminal activity, his intentional misleading of Plaintiff 
regarding his absence from this state and the use of funds expended 
for fines and restitution, as well as his misrepresentations about 
his honesty and integrity have caused Plaintiff great suffering and 
distress and constitutes sufficient grounds for an annulment of the 
marriage between the parties. 
7. That upon learning of the true nature and disposition 
of Defendant, Plaintiff ceased cohabitation with Defendant and 
seeks annulment of this marriage by action of this Court. 
8. It is reasonable and proper that this Court 
reasonably and equitably divide the possessions, debts and 
obligations of these parties. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 
through 8, as though fully set forth herein. 
10. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have developed between the parties, to the degree that 
continuation of the marriage relationship is impossible. 
11. It is reasonable and proper that this Court equitably 
and reasonably divide the debts, obligations and possessions of 
these parties. 
WHEREFORE, as to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, 
Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. That the marriage of the parties be declared null and 
void as though it did not exist. 
2. That the debts, obligations and possessions of the 
parties be reasonably and equitably divided by the Court. 
3. That Plaintiff be restored to her former name, 
Haacke. 
WHEREFORE, as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, 
Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. For a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of 
matrimony between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. That the debts, obligations and possessions of the 
parties be reasonably divided by the Court. 
3. That Plaintiff be restored to her former name, 
Haacke. 
DATED this 11th day of September, 1990. 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN 
Attorney for Pi&intiff 
APPENDIX D 
FILED IN CLS3K f3GrriCE 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (3 668) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIEANN GLENN, 
Plaintiff, : AMENDED STIPULATION AND 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
vs. : 
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, : Civil No. 900748406DA 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, LeslieAnn Glenn, and Defendant, 
Mark Mitchell Glenn, and do hereby stipulate, agree and compromise 
the issues in the above-referenced action as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant stipulate and agree that they 
are desirous of entering into this Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement and division of all of the respective property 
rights, and effecting a complete settlement of all issues of child 
support, alimony, attorney's fees, court costs and other related 
matters. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant recognize that a Complaint 
for Divorce is on file herein, having been filed by Plaintiff on or 
about the 5th day of September, 1990. 
3. Defendant, by execution of this Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement, hereby waives further action on his 
Filial 
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part. Defendant agrees and understands that by his signature, he 
has given his consent to the entry of a default judgment herein, 
and has entered his appearance and consented to jurisdiction of the 
Court in this matter. Defendant further consents that this Court 
may enter his default and finalize this action at any time, 
awarding Plaintiff a Decree of Annulment or, in the alternative, a 
Decree of Divorce upon the grounds as set forth in Plaintiff's 
Complaint, without further notice to him. Defendant specifically 
requests that this Court finalize the above-reference action as 
soon as possible, with a waiver of the statutory waiting period, 
should the Court deem such action appropriate. 
4. There have no children born to Plaintiff and 
Defendant as issue of this marriage and none is expected. 
Plaintiff was previously informed that she was pregnant, but upon 
further verification, it has been discovered that Plaintiff has 
either miscarried or that the original prognosis was incorrect. 
5. The parties shall each be awarded those possessions 
and items in his/her possession at the present time. The parties 
stipulate that they have fairly and equitably divided the 
possessions belonging to them. 
6. Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Defendant harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand Dollars 
($28,000.00) owed to Key Bank, representing the debt on 
Plaintiff!s automobile; 
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(b) approximate amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($7,500.00) owed to Brigham Young University for 
Plaintiff's student loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($11,500.00) owed to Loan Servicing Corporation of 
Utah for Plaintifffs student loan; and 
(d) approximate amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Five 
Dollars ($235.00) to Broadway Southwest; 
(e) approximate amount of Fourteen Thousand Dollars 
($14,000.00) owed to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke, in the 
form of a second mortgage on Mr. Haacke's residence. 
7. Defendant shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of One Thousand Fifty-Nine 
Dollars ($1,059.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for Defendant's 
automobile. 
(b) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fourteen Dollars 
($914.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a signature loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Two Dollars ($2872.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a 
signature loan; 
(d) approximate amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Six 
Dollars ($2306.00) to Discover Card; 
(e) approximate amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Ninety-One Dollars ($2691.00) to MBNA America for Defendant's 
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Mastercard; 
(f) approximate amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred 
Thirty-Two Dollars ($2532.00) to Security Pacific Bank of 
Arizona for Defendant's Visa; 
(g) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
($916.00) to Z.C.M.I.; and 
(h) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($950.00) to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke. 
8. In addition to the above-referenced debts and 
obligations, there is an additional obligation owed to Plaintiff's 
father, Verl L. Haacke, of Bountiful, Utah, in the approximate 
amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2 6,500.00) , at 
eight percent (8%) interest per annum. The parties shall repay 
said Plaintiff's father in the following amounts, and shall 
indemnify, defend and hold the other party harmless from his/her 
responsibility incident to this debt: 
(a) Plaintiff shall be responsible for the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00), to be paid 
at the rate of One Hundred Eighty Dollars ($180.00) per month, 
for a period of thirty months, with payment of the balance in 
full within thirty days of the last payment; and 
(b) Defendant shall be responsible for the amount of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be paid at the rate of One 
Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00) per month, for thirty months, 
with payment of the balance in full within thirty days of the 
last payment. Defendant shall pay this debt in full as soon 
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as circumstances permit refinancing or other means of said 
payment. 
9. It is the intent of the parties that Defendant shall 
continue his efforts to refinance all or part of the joint debts of 
this marriage as delineated in the above-paragraphs, to remove 
Plaintiff's name from those debts and relieve Plaintiff from any 
obligation pertaining thereto. Defendant recognizes a continuing 
affirmative obligation to put forth the necessary efforts to obtain 
proper refinancing and clear Plaintiff's credit as soon as such 
action is possible. 
10. Plaintiff is in possession of a 1990 Mazda Miata 
automobile, which automobile is held solely in her name. Defendant 
waives all claim to the said automobile. The parties are also 
owners of a 1976 MG automobile, currently in the possession of 
Defendant. The said MG automobile shall remain in the ownership of 
both parties, until Defendant has successfully refinanced or paid 
the debts as delineated above, when the automobile shall be solely 
awarded to Defendant. Defendant shall indemnify, defend and hold 
Plaintiff harmless from any and all obligations pertaining to the 
said MG automobile, so long as it is in his possession. 
11. Defendant shall fully insure the said MG automobile, 
so long as Plaintiff's name is shown on the financing documents or 
title, and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Plaintiff from 
any claim or damage arising from his failure to do so. To this 
end, the parties shall continue to arrange for automobile insurance 
on a joint basis, as they have in the past. Each party shall be 
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responsible to pay the respective costs of insurance, on a prorated 
basis in accordance with policy costs on his/her particular 
automobile. 
12. No alimony shall be awarded to Defendant in this 
case. Defendant hereby waives and relinquishes his right to claim 
alimony against Plaintiff, at present and in the future. 
13. No pension or retirement benefits/assets shall be 
awarded in this"case. Plaintiff and Defendant hereby waive and 
relinquish his/her right to claim against the pension or retirement 
benefits/assets of the other party. 
14. The parties shall each indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless one other from any and all past tax obligations, as well 
as any and all debts or obligations incurred since the parties1 
separation. 
15. Each of the parties shall sign all papers, documents, 
titles, deeds and any other document necessary to effect any of the 
provisions hereof, including but not limited to the transfer of 
real or personal property. 
16. Plaintiff shall be restored to her former name of 
Haacke. 
17. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two 
Hundred Eighty-Eight and 50/100 Dollars ($282.50), representing 
one-half of the cost of attorneyfs fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
finalization of this action. 
6 
T 
DATED t h i s 
/ 7 
lfl_ day of KMtitnbtS- . 1990, 
j LESLIEANN GLENN 
L^liintiff 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTY, LeslieAnn Glenn, personally appeared 
before me, a notary public, on the date above-written, and having 
been duly sworn upon her oath acknowledged to me that she was the 
person that had executed the above and foregoing STIPULATION AND 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, having read and understood it, and 
knowing the contents thereof, and having voluntarily subscribed her 
name thereto intending to be bound thereby. 
/ / 
My Commxd^ion E x p i r e s : 
Residing a t : j^lflffitlV Wul 
7 
DATED this ' day of .^^AT . , 1990. 
I 5 "
 A 
* 1 \ , 1 H^M 
MARK MITCHEliL GLENN 
Defendant \ 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTY, Mark Mitchell Glenn, personally 
appeared before me, a notary public, on the date above-written, and 
having been duly sworn upon his oath acknowledged to me that he was 
the person that had executed the above and foregoing STIPULATION 
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, having read and understood it, 
and knowing the contents thereof, and having voluntarily subscribed 
his name thereto intending to be bound thereby. 
mvMv, kpi iXrtl I 
My Commission Expires: 
i -Co q i 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t : Ebl'Tltiful U l a h 
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APPENDIX E 
FILED IN C:- = :"3f?-:~ 
D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (3668) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESLIEANN GLENN, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
MARK MITCHELL GLENN, : Civil No. 900748406DA 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came on for regular hearing on 
the 14th day of September, 1990, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge presiding. Plaintiff appeared 
in person and was represented by her Counsel D. Michael Nielsen. 
Defendant neither appeared in person nor by Counsel, having 
previously executed a Waiver of Service and Stipulation allowing 
his default to be entered. 
Plaintiff being first duly sworn, the Court having heard 
the testimony introduced on behalf of Plaintiff, and being familiar 
with the pleadings and papers en file herein and being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter rhe following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action an actual and 
$5? 13 ioi2*rsfl 
bona fide resident of Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on the 16th day of December, 1989, in Bountiful, Davis 
County, Utah. 
3. The parties maintained their marital domicile in 
Davis County, State of Utah, and the acts complained of by 
Plaintiff herein occurred in Davis County, State of Utah. 
4. There have no children born to Plaintiff and 
Defendant as issue of this marriage and none are expected. 
Plaintiff was previously informed that she was pregnant, but upon 
further verification, it has been discovered that Plaintiff has 
either miscarried or that the original prognosis was incorrect. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce in 
this matter in that prior to the marriage, Defendant did make 
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning his honesty, 
trustworthiness and lack of criminal involvement. Defendant failed 
to inform Plaintiff that he had been convicted of a felony in the 
state of his previous residence, Alabama; he informed Plaintiff 
that he was traveling to Alabama to take care of prior child 
support obligations and problems, when in reality he was utilizing 
the funds of these parties for payment of fines and restitution, 
and he failed to inform Plaintiff of his prior criminal activity, 
much to Plaintiff's detriment in the form of less of her employment 
with the State of Utah, Department of Corrections. 
6. Defendant's misrepresentations about his lack of 
criminal activity, his intentional misleading of Plaintiff 
regarding his absence from this state and the use of funds expended 
for fines and restitution, as well as his misrepresentations about 
his honesty and integrity have caused Plaintiff great suffering and 
distress and constitutes sufficient grounds for the granting of a 
Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing 
between these parties. 
7. The parties shall each be awarded those possessions 
and items in his/her possession at the present time. 
8. Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Defendant harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand Dollars 
($23,000.00) owed to Key Bank, representing the debt en 
Plaintiff f s automobile; 
(b) approximate amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($7,500.00) owed to Brigham Young University for 
Plaintiff's student loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($11,500.00) owed to Loan Servicing Corporation of 
Utah for Plaintiff's student loan; and 
(d) approximate amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Five 
Dollars ($235.00) to Broadway Southwest; 
(e) approximate amount of Fourteen Thousand Dollars 
($14,000.00) owed to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke, in the 
form of a second mortgage on Mr. Haackefs residence. 
9. Defendant shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of One Thousand Fifty-Nine 
Dollars ($1,059.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for Defendant's 
automobile. 
(b) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fourteen Dollars 
($914.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a signature loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Two Dollars ($2872.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a 
signature loan; 
(d) approximate amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Six 
Dollars ($2306.00) to Discover Card; 
(e) approximate amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Ninety-One Dollars ($2691.00) to MBNA America for Defendant's 
Mastercard; 
(f) approximate amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred 
Thirty-Two Dollars ($2532.00) to Security Pacific Bank of 
Arizona for Defendant's Visa; 
(g) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
($916.00) to Z.C.M.I.; and 
(h) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($950.00) to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke. 
10. In addition to the above-referenced debts and 
obligations, there is an additional obligation owed to Plaintiff's 
father, Verl L. Haacke, of Bountiful, Utah, in the approximate 
amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($26,500.00), at 
a 4 
eight percent (8%) interest per annum. The parties shall repay 
said Plaintiff's father in the following amounts, and shall 
indemnify, defend and hold the other party harmless from his/her 
responsibility incident to this debt: 
(a) Plaintiff shall be responsible for the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) , to be paid 
at the rate of One Hundred Eighty Dollars ($130.00) per month, 
for a period of thirty months, with payment of the balance in 
full within thirty days of the last payment; and 
(b) Defendant shall be responsible for the amount of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be paid at the rate of One 
Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00) per month, for thirty months, 
with payment of the balance in full within thirty days of the 
last payment. Defendant shall pay this debt in full as soon 
as circumstances permit refinancing or other means of said 
payment. 
11. It is the intent of the parties that Defendant shall 
continue his efforts to refinance all or part of the joint debts of 
this marriage as delineated in the above-paragraphs, to remove 
Plaintiff's name from those debts and relieve Plaintiff from any 
obligation pertaining thereto. Defendant recognizes a continuing 
affirmative obligation to put forth the necessary efforts to obtain 
proper refinancing and clear Plaintiff's credit as soon as such 
action is possible. 
12. Plaintiff is in possession of a 1S90 Mazda Miata 
automobile, which automobile is held solely in her name. Defendant 
waives all claim to the said automobile. The parties are also 
owners of a 1976 MG automobile, currently in the possession of 
Defendant. The said MG automobile shall remain in the ownership of 
both parties, until Defendant has successfully refinanced or paid 
the debts as delineated above, when the automobile shall be solely 
awarded to Defendant. Defendant shall indemnify, defend and hold 
Plaintiff harmless from any and all obligations pertaining to the 
said MG automobile, so long as it is in his possession. 
13. Defendant shall fully insure the said MG automobile, 
so long as Plaintiff's name is shown on the financing documents or 
title, and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Plaintiff from 
any claim or damage arising from his failure to do so. To this 
end, the parties shall continue to arrange for automobile insurance 
on a joint basis, as they have in the past. Each party shall be 
responsible to pay the respective costs of insurance, on a prorated 
basis in accordance with policy costs on his/her particular 
automobile. 
14. No alimony shall be awarded to Defendant in this 
case. Defendant hereby waives and relinquishes his right to claim 
alimony against Plaintiff, at present and in rhe future. 
15. No pension or retirement benefits/assets shall be 
awarded in this case. Plaintiff and Defendant hereby waive and 
relinquish his/her right to claim against the pension or retirement 
benefits/assets of the other party. 
16. The parties shall each indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless one other from any and all past tax obligations, as well 
as any and all debts or obligations incurred since the parties1 
separation. 
17. Each of the parties shall sign all papers, documents, 
titles, deeds and any other document necessary to effect any of the 
provisions hereof, including but not limited to the transfer of 
real or personal property. 
18. Plaintiff shall be restored to her former name of 
Haacke. 
19. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two 
Hundred Eighty-Eight and 50/100 Dollars ($282.50), representing 
one-half of the cost of attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
finalization of this action. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the 
above-entitled matter and Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce, dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between these 
parties. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, the 
same to become absolute and final upon entry in the register of 
actions. 
3. The Decree of Divorce should be entered and granted 
a^ 
in accordance with the Findings of Fact entered herein. 
DATED this P day of Se^z^T , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
UM 
RODNEY §J P A G E 0 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVAL AND REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY 
Defendant, Mark Mitchell Glenn hereby certifies that he 
has read the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
that he approves the same and that he requests that the Court enter 
the same immediately. Defendant hereby waives his right to object 
to the said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and requests 
the Court execute the same immediately. 




in accordance with the Findings of Fact entered herein. 
DATED this H^ day of §e^j" , 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
(TV^CAAJU^ X\ <• VOL 5 ^ . 
RODNEY SJ PAGE T 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVAL AND REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY 
Defendant, Mark Mitchell Glenn hereby certifies that he 
has read the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
that he approves the same and that he requests that the Court enter 
the same immediately. Defendant hereby waives his right to object 
to the said Findings of Facr and Conclusions of Law, and requests 
the Court execute the same immediately. 
DATED this / ^ day of cr^> A , 1990. 
MARK MITCHELiy GLENN 
Defendant 
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D. MICHAEL NIELSEN (3 663) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-1818 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 




MARX MITCHELL GLENN, 
Defendant, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No- 900748406DA 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 14th day 
of September, 1990, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding. 
The Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by D. 
Michael Nielsen, Esquire. The Defendant was neither present in 
Court nor represented by Counsel, having previously signed a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement on file herein. 
The Court determined that the default of rhe Defendant 
should be and the same is hereby entered. The Plaintiff, having 
been duly sworn and having testified, the Court having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
•SiiU&.tH'i tti'U,..^ 
_\k 
the bonds of matrimony and marriage contract existing between the 
parties, said Decree to become final and absolute upon signing and 
entry in the registrar of actions, 
2. There have no children born to Plaintiff and 
Defendant as issue of this marriage and none are expected. 
Plaintiff was previously informed that she was pregnant, but upon 
further verification, it has been discovered that Plaintiff has 
either miscarried or that the original prognosis was incorrect. 
3. The parties are hereby awarded those possessions and 
items in his/her possession at the present time. 
4. Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Defendant harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand Dollars 
($23,000.00) owed to Key Bank, representing the debt: on 
Plaintiff's automobile; 
(b) approximate amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($7,500.00) owed to Brigham Young University for 
Plaintiff's student loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($11,500.00) owed to Loan Servicing Corporation of 
Utah for Plaintiff's student loan; and 
(d) approximate amount of Two Hundred Thirty-Five 
Dollars ($235.00) to Broadway Southwest; 
(e) approximate amount of Fourteen Thousand Dollars 
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($14,000.00) owed to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke, in the 
form of a second mortgage on Mr. Haacke's residence. 
5. Defendant shall be solely responsible for the 
following debts and obligations, and shall indemnify, defend and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom: 
(a) approximate amount of One Thousand Fifty-Nine 
Dollars ($1,059.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for Defendant's 
automobile. 
(b) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fourteen Dollars 
($914.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a signature loan; 
(c) approximate amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Two Dollars ($2872.00) to E.S.E. Credit Union for a 
signature loan; 
(d) approximate amount of Two Thousand Three Hundred Six 
Dollars ($2306.00) to Discover Card; 
(e) approximate amount of Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Ninety-One Dollars ($2691.00) to MBNA Airierica for Defendant's 
Mastercard; 
(f) approximate amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred 
Thirty-Two Dollars ($2532.00) to Security Pacific Bank of 
Arizona for Defendant's Visa; 
(g) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
($916.00) to Z.C.M.I.; and 
(h) approximate amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($950.00) to Plaintiff's father, Verl Haacke. 
6. In addition to the above-referenced debts and 
3 
obligations, there is an additional obligation owed to Plaintiff?s 
father, Verl L. Haacke, of Bountiful, Utah, in the approximate 
amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2 6,500.00), at 
eight percent (8%) interest per annum. The parties shall repay 
said Plaintiff's father in the following amounts, and shall 
indemnify, defend and hold the other party harmless from his/her 
responsibility incident to this debt: 
(a) Plaintiff shall be responsible for the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00), to be paid 
at the rate of One Hundred Eighty Dollars ($130.00) per month, 
for a period of thirty months, with payment of the balance in 
full within thirty days of the last payment; and 
(b) Defendant shall be responsible for the amount of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be paid at the rate of One 
Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120.00) per month, for thirty months, 
with payment: of the balance in full within thirty days of the 
last payment. Defendant shall pay this debt in full as soon 
as circumstances permit refinancing or other means of said 
payment. 
7. Defendant shall continue his efforts to refinance all 
or part of the joint debts of this marriage as delineated in the 
above-paragraphs, to remove Plaintiff's name from those debts and 
relieve Plaintiff from any obligation pertaining thereto. 
Defendant recognizes a continuing affirmative obligation to put 
forth the necessary efforts to obtain proper refinancing and clear 
Plaintiff's credit as soon as such action is possible. 
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8. Plaintiff is in possession of a 1990 Mazda Miata 
automobile, which automobile is held solely in her name. Defendant 
has waived all claim to the said automobile. The parties are also 
owners of a 1976 MG automobile, currently in the possession of 
Defendant. The said MG automobile shall remain in the ownership of 
both parties, until Defendant has successfully refinanced or paid 
the debts as delineated above, when the automobile shall be solely 
awarded to Defendant. Defendant shall indemnify, defend and hold 
Plaintiff harmless from any and all obligations pertaining to the 
said MG automobile, so long as it is in his possession. 
9. Defendant shall fully insure the said MG automobile, 
so long as Plaintiff !s name is shown on the financing documents or 
title, and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Plaintiff from 
any claim or damage arising from his failure to do so. To this 
end, the parties shall continue to arrange for automobile insurance 
on a joint basis, as they have in the past. Each party shall be 
responsible to pay the respective costs of insurance, on a prorated 
basis in accordance with policy costs on his/her particular 
automobile. 
10. No alimony shall be awarded to Defendant in this 
case. Defendant has waived and relinquished his right to claim 
alimony against Plaintiff, at present and in the future. 
11. No pension or retirement benefits/assets shall be 
awarded in this case. Plaintiff and Defendant have waived and 
relinquish his/her right to claim against the pension or retirement 
benefits/assets of the other party. 
5 
12. The parties shall each indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless one other from any and all past tax obligations, as well 
as any and all debts or obligations incurred since the parties1 
separation. 
13. Each of the parties shall sign all papers, documents, 
titles, deeds and any other document necessary to effect any of the 
provisions hereof, including but not limited to the transfer of 
real or personal property. 
14. Plaintiff shall be restored to her former name of 
Haacke. 
15. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two 
Hundred Eighty-Eight and 50/100 Dollars ($232.50), representing 
one-half of the cost of attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
finalization of this action. 
DATED this N^ day of SoJr , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
W/jj.i* A - VOJ_ 
RODNEY"
 (S\. PAGE $ 
DISTRICT^ JUDGE 
6 
APPROVAL AND REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE ENTRY 
Defendant, Mark Mitchell Glenn hereby certifies that he 
has read the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE, that he approves the same 
and that he requests that the Court enter the same immediately. 
Defendant hereby waives his right to object to the said Decree, and 
requests that the Court execute the same immediately. 
DATED this ^ day of ^U^-ruVLj\ 1990. 
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case. In our view, the Legislature, in defining kidnapping in the 
second degree , did not purpose to include a res t ra in t of such an 
insubstant ia l na tu re as was present in the case a t bar, part icular ly 
when such conduct is covered by another and more specific Penal Law 
section (§ 135.10, ent i t led "Unlawful imprisonment in the first de-
gree") , which provides: 
"A person is gui l ty of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree 
when he res t ra ins ano ther person under circumstances which expose 
the l a t t e r to a risk of serious physical injury." 
Nor a re we persuaded by the contention t h a t the defendant ' s 
acquit ta l on the robbery charge in some way created a vacuum in 
which the j u ry could view the charge of kidnapping in the second 
degree in tota l isolation from the facts in the case and cont ra ry to the 
prosecution's own theory tha t a robbery and a larceny actual ly had 
taken place (cf. People v. Sigismondi, 49 Misc.2d 1, 266 N.Y.S.2d 724, 
affd. 27 A.D.2d 937, 280 N.Y.S,2d 912, affd. 21 N.Y,2d 186, 287 
N.Y.S.2d 33, 234 N.E.2d 212). 
We have examined the other points raised by the de fendan t and 
find them to be wi thou t merit. 
Accordingly, the j u d g m e n t of conviction should be reversed, on the 
law, and the count for kidnapping in the second degree dismissed. 
J u d g m e n t reversed, on the law, and the count for said cr ime is 
dismissed, 
KAhLs .> : j '» l 'k i : -w - tiKLS'i ..i. . Mi N b h ? , . 
concur. 
50 A.D.2d 806 
Esther AVNERY, Respondent, v. Joseph AVNEIO »ellant. 
S u p r e m e Court, Appellate Division, Second I>*-p -nt. 
Dec. 8. 1975. 
The Supreme Court , Kings County, g ran ted a n n u l m e n t of mar-
riage, and husband appealed. The Supreme Court, Appel la te Division, 
Second D e p a r t m e n t , held t ha t evidence was insufficient to suppor t 
f inding t h a t husband had fraudulently obtained wife's consent to 
mar ry ; t h a t wife had not shown tha t husband's fraud would have 
AVNERY v AVNERY g g 9 
Cite as 375 N.Y.S.2d S68 
deceived ordinari ly p ruden t person; and t h a t wife's action for a n n u l -
ment was barred on ground of condonat ion prior to c o m m e n c e m e n t of 
action. 
Reversed and reman* h 
Hopkins, J.» concurred : result . 
"Marriage fe58(7) 
In order to obtain a n n u l m e n t of mar r i age on ground of f r aud , 
,.>ntiff mus t establish fraud which would deceive an o rd inar i ly 
udent person, and t h a t plaintiff would not have consented to 
u i rnage absent pract ice of fraud. Domestic Relat ions Law § 140(e). 
» Marriage <s=>60(7) 
Evidence t ha t husband had misrepresented to wife t h a t he loved 
er and t h a t he marr ied her solely to t ake over her businesses , real 
• roperty, and personal proper ty , was not sufficient to suppo r t t r ia l 
our t ' s f inding t h a t wife had consented to mar r i age on basis of 
husband 's fraud. Domestic Relat ions Law § 140(e). 
3, Marriage *=^60(7) 
Where wife's pleadings admi t t ed t h a t it may have been e v i d e n t to 
objective observers t h a t husband never loved her and marr ied h e r only 
[or her money, wife had not met tes t of showing tha t her consen t to 
mar r i age was result of false represen ta t ions on pa r t of husband which 
would have deceived ordinarily p ruden t persons. Domestic Rela t ions 
Law § 140(e). 
4, Marriage <t=>59 
Where wife had cohabited wi th husband and cont inued to have 
mar i ta l relat ions with him af te r becoming a w a r e t h a t husband had 
made misrepresenta t ions of his love in order to obtain her consen t to 
mar ry , wife's action for a n n u l m e n t on ground of fraud in o b t a i n i n g 
consent was bar red by wife's condonation prior to c o m m e n c e m e n t of 
action. Domestic Relations Law § 140(e). 
He rbe r t Carr , New York City, for appel lant . 
Allen M. Fischer, Brooklyn (Roy A. Sa t ine , N e w York City, of 
counsel), for respondent . 
Before RABIN, Act ing p . j . t and M A R T U S C E L L O , B R E N N A N , 
M U N D E R and H O P K I N S , J J . 
MEMORANDUM BY T H E COURT. 
In an action to annul a mar r i age , the de fendan t husband appea l s 
from a j u d g m e n t of the Supreme Court , Kings County, da ted N o v e m -
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ber 6, 1974, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, granted the 
annulment. 
Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and 
case remitted to Special Term for further proceedings consistent 
herewith. 
This action for annulment was brought pursuant to section 140 
(subd. [e]) of the Domestic Relations Law on the ground that plain-
tiff's consent to the marriage was obtained by fraud. Contrary to the 
finding by the trial court, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish 
her cause of action. 
[1, 2] In order to obtain an annulment on the ground of fraud, a 
plaintiff must establish fraud which is " 'material, to that degree that, 
had it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consent-
ed to the marriage' (Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra [174 N.Y. 467], p. 
471, 67 N.E. 63, 64), and is 'of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily 
prudent person.' (Id. p. 474, 67 N.E. p. 65)" (Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 
N.Y. 477, 479-480, 184 N.E. 60, 61). Plaintiff sought to annul her 
marriage on the ground that defendant had falsely represented that 
he loved her. She alleged that he misrepresented not only his love, 
but also his prior business experience and expertise and that he 
married not for love, and not to provide her with a home, etc., but 
solely to take over her businesses and real and personal property. 
The record reveals that plaintiff met defendant while visiting Israel 
in June, 1971. Theirs was a whirlwind courtship; she took him back 
to New York, where they were married on July 4, 1971. They lived 
together, albeit not always in harmony, for more than two years. 
Plaintiff literally threw her money away on defendant and his family 
during that entire period. She bought him new teeth, new clothes, 
and a new hairpiece; she paid for his transportation to America and 
for all of the expenses of the wedding; she also paid the expenses of 
bringing defendant's sister and son and daughter-in-law to America; 
and she transferred one-half of the real property which she owned in 
Brooklyn to defendant. She did all of this willingly and without 
hesitation. She was an experienced business woman who had been 
married more than once prior to meeting defendant. She knew that 
defendant was divorced and that he had virtually no assets of his own. 
In short, plaintiff may have been disappointed in how her marriage 
turned out, but she was not deceived in entering into it. 
The facts in this case are very similar to those in Woronzoff-Dasch-
koff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff (303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E.2d 877), in which 
the Court />f Appeals stated (p. 510, 104 N.E.2d p. 879): 
"The trial court found that defendant had made all the representa-
tions alleged in the complaint, and that plaintiff had relied on them 
in giving her consent to the marriage. Those representations, so 
AVNERY v. AVNERY 891 
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held the trial court, were all false in that defendant had, in Paris, 
received a large sum of money from his former wife, as a price for 
divorce, that defendant's sole purpose in marrying plaintiff was to 
get money for his own life of idleness and for his relatives, that to 
accomplish this he permitted plaintiff to pay all the honeymoon 
expenses and took money from her, that he attempted secretly to 
collect commissions from the contractor who remodeled plaintiff's 
home, that he tried to get money from plaintiff on the pretext of 
starting a business and tried to get her to set up a trust fund with 
him as her trustee, that he never made any real effort to find work 
or to support himself, and that he at no time offered 'to fulfill his 
marital obligation and promise to plaintiff to provide a home for her 
and to support himself. Such were the findings." 
The Court of Appeals went on to hold (pp. 511-512, 104 N.E.2d p. 
880): 
"Defendant, on that showing, was no model of chivalry or propriety. 
That proof, believed by the trier of the facts, was enough, we will 
assume, to expose him as a fortune hunter, a sluggard, a hypochon-
driac, and a man who took his promises lightly. But this is a suit to 
annul a marriage for fraud, and, while we have, for better or worse, 
retreated, di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 
L.R.A. 92; Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 481, 184 N.E. 60, 61, 
from the old idea that marriages can be voided only for frauds 
going to the essentials of marriage, that is, consortium and cohabi-
tation, it is, nonetheless, still the law in New York that annulments 
are decreed, not for any and every kind of fraud, Mirizio v. Mirizio, 
242 N.Y. 74, 80, 150 N.E. 605, 607, 44 A.L.R. 714; Svenson v. 
Svenson, 178 N.Y. 54, 59, 70 N.E. 120, 122, but for fraud as to 
matters 4vital' to the marriage relationship only. Lapides v. 
Lapides, 254 N.Y. 73, 80, 171 N.E. 911, 913. Premarital falsehoods 
as to love and affection are not enough, nor disclosure that one 
partner 'married for money' ". 
[3] While the fraud, required for an annulment must be " 'of such 
a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person' " (see Shonfeld v. 
Shonfeld, supra, 260 N.Y. p. 480, 184 N.E. p. 61; see, also, Kober v. 
Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 195, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367, 211 N.E.2d 817, 819), 
it appears that the trial court used a different standard. For exam-
ple, the trial court observed, in its decision, that "although clear signs 
that the defendant never loved her were evident to objective observ-
ers from the outset, she [plaintiff] did not see them. She married 
under the spell of the defendant's protestations of love" (emphasis 
supplied). At another point in its decision the trial court stated, "in 
retrospect, the ingenious schemes of the defendant to take over the 
plaintiff's assets and real property ought to have become clear to her 
long before it did. Such hindsight, however, is seldom given to those 
892 3 7 5 N E W Y 0 R K SUPPLEMENT. 2d SERIES 
in love. The prudence required to be shown by the mythical 'ordinary 
man' must be applied reasonably by a court to the actual 'ordinary 
woman in love'," There is even an admission in plaintiffs brief that 
"although clear signs that appellant never loved her, wanted only her 
money and had used her, may have been evident to objective observers 
from the outset, respondent did not see them'1 (emphasis supplied). In 
other words, all concerned seem to agree that an "ordinarily prudent 
person" would not have been deceived by defendant's conduct and/or 
statements and would not have entered into marriage in reliance 
thereon. Such conduct or statements, therefore, cannot support the 
judgment. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court did not err in finding that 
defendant's sole purpose in inducing plaintiff to marry him was to 
evade the United States immigration laws pertaining to the entry of 
aliens. While fraud on this point might, in certain cases, constitute 
grounds for annulment (see, e. g., Brillis v. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d 125, 173 
N.Y.S.2d 3, 149 N.E.2d 510), the fact is the trial court made no such 
finding in this case. 
[4] Finally, a careful review of the record convinces that, subse-
quent to June 15, 1973, almost two years after these parties were 
married, and with full knowledge of all that had gone on, plaintiff 
voluntarily cohabited with defendant and had sexual intercourse with 
him as his wife. She so testified. Accordingly, were we not reversing 
the judgment for failure of proof, we would reach the same result on 
the ground of condonation prior to commencement of the action (see 
Domestic Relations Law, § 140, subd. [ej). 
In view of our conclusion that the marriage Id not have been 
annulled, the case is remanded to Special Term >^consideration of 
the provisions of the judgment concerning the <,. . rship of and title 
to the various properties, as well as the av\ of counsel fees. 
RABIN, Acting P. J , and MARTUSCELLO, BRENNAN and MUN-
DER, J J., concur. 
HOPKINS, J., concurs in the result, but only upon the ground of 
condonation. 
NANCY II v. LAHRY II 
Cite as 175 N.Y.SJd 8§3 
50 A.D.2d 963 
In the Matter of NANCY II *, Regpoiidetil. v. LARRY II *, Appellant. 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department. 
Dec. 4, 1975. 
The father appealed from an order of the Family Court, Schuyler 
County, granting the mother custody of the four children and order-
ing the father to pay $15 per week support for each child. The 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that order awarding custody 
on sole ground that the mother was the preferred parent for custody 
of young children was error and matter would be remanded for a new 
hearing to take testimony as to changes in circumstances since origi-
nal hearing. 
Order reversed and matter remitted. 
1 Divorce «=» 298(1), 312.7 
Order of family court granting mother custody of the four 
children following the obtaining of a divorce by father on sole ground 
that the mother was preferred custodian for young children was error 
as being contrary to statutory declaration that there is no prima facie 
right to custody of child in either parent, and matter was remanded 
for new hearing as to any change in circumstances since time of 
original hearing so that trial court could ascertain the best interests of 
children. Domestic Relations Law § 240. 
2. Appeal and Error *=> 1122(2) 
Although Appellate Division has power to review questions of law 
and fact and may in a proper case render such judgment as should 
have been rendered by trial court after a nonjury trial, where evi-
dence is in sharp conflict and veracity of witnesses is critical, it must 
order a new trial and not make new findings of fact. 
James E. Halpin, Odessa, for appellant. 
W. K. Cuddy, III, Montour Falls, for respondent. 
Before SWEENEY, J P ,
 a n d KANE, KOREMAN, MAIN and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
Appeal from an order of the r , ( <>urt, Schuyler County 
entered July 18, 1975, which g r a n t s ^ u t i o n e r custody of her four 
» Fictitious names. 
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juries inflicted on appellant. This, how-
ever, the court was not bound to conclude. 
The issue was one of fact, and from the 
negative evidence that the respondents had 
not used or had in their possession or con-
trol any dynamite caps after disposing of 
those used four years before in blasting op-
erations on the nearby ranch, from the evi-
dence that none of those who frequented 
the pump house had seen the coat in the 
pocket of which the caps were placed in the 
pump house, until the children found it 
hanging there, the trial court could con-
clude, as it did, that the presence of the 
caps in the pump house was unknown to 
the respondents, and that they had been 
placed there or permitted to be there by 
no act of the respondents or those for 
whose actions respondents were respon-
sible. It is true that, since the Reynolds 
family, including the children, were prop-
erly on the premises, the dwelling house 
and its immediate environs at least, being 
furnished to Reynolds, senior, as a part of 
his compensation for labor, liability could 
he fastened upon respondents if they were 
negligent in allowing so highly dangerous 
a commodity as dynamite caps to be in a 
place where the children could obtain them 
(10 A.L.R.2d p. 22, et seq.) ; but here again 
whether or not respondents were negligent 
in not having, through more frequent in-
spections of the premises, discovered the 
presence of the caps was a question of 
fact for the trial court. Any negligence 
in their care of the premises had to be re-
lated to the matter of inspection under 
all the circumstances, including those as 
to the use of the pump house which the 
court found to be of such a nature as not 
to require anyone to be in there, except 
when the pump was operating, since the 
pump house, according to the testimony, 
was used for no other purpose than to house 
the pump. Having found the respondents 
did not store or keep the caps in the build-
ing, the question of whether or not respond-
ents, in the exercise of due care, should 
have, by reasonable inspection, discovered 
the caps before the children did, was for the 
trial court to determine. The circum-
stances support the court's findings ab-
solving respondents. 
We find no error in the record. 
The judgment is affirmed, 
PEEK and SCHOTTKY, JJ.f concur. 
Isabella Krossber D O U G L A S S , Plaintiff 
and Appe l lan t , 
v. 
Russell D O U G L A S S , Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Civ. 22267. 
District Court of Appeal. Second District, 
Division 3, California. 
March 1, 1057. 
Annulment proceeding by wife. The 
Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Bay-
ard Rhone, J., denied annulment, and wife 
appealed. The District Court of Appeal. 
Shinn, P. J., held that wife was entitled to 
annulment. 
Judgment reversed with instructions. 
1. Marr iage <©==58(7) 
Test as to whether marriage should be 
annulled is whether the false representa-
tions or concealment were such that es-
sential purpose of injured spouse inherent 
in the contracting of the marriage was 
defeated. West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 82. 
2. Marriage ©==58(7) 
Wife, who was induced to marry by 
husband's false representations that he was 
an honest, law abiding, respectable, and 
honorable man and that he had a little girl 
who was well provided for, was entitled to 
annulment in view of facts that father had 
been convicted of grand theft, was a parole 
DOUGLASS v. 
Cite as 307 
violator and a fugitive from justice, and was 
guilty of failure to support two children 
of a former marriage. West's Ann.Civ. 
Code, § 82. 
3, Marriage €=^58(7) 
Either party to marriage has right to 
annulment decree where the fraud relied 
upon as justification for rescission of the 
marriage contract is so grievous that it 
places injured party in a relationship which 
is intolerable because it cannot honorably 
be endured. West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 82. 
4. Equity @=»il 
Equity will not deny relief where a 
plan of deceit, which has been laid out and 
consummated, must inevitably defeat the 
essential purposes of the deceived party in 
entering into the relationship. 
Krag & Krag and William L. Mock, 
Alhambra, for appellant. 
SHINN, Presiding Justice. 
Tsabelle Krossber Douglass sued Russell 
Douglass for annulment of their marriage 
contracted August 9, 1955. She alleged that 
her consent to the marriage was induced 
by defendant's fraud in that he falsely and 
fraudulently represented to her that he was 
an honest, law abiding, respectable and 
honorable man and concealed from her his 
real character; she believed and relied upon 
said representations and otherwise would 
not have consented to the marriage. De-
fendant, in fact, had been convicted March 
17, 1951 in Minnesota of the offense of 
grand theft; he was paroled to the Minne-
sota State Board of Parole; February 18, 
1952, by order of the court, stay of ex-
ecution of sentence was vacated and he was 
committed to the county jail at Moorhead, 
Minnesota. The foregoing facts were con-
cealed from plaintiff with the fraudulent 
intent of deceiving her; November 24, 
1955, upon the discovery of the falsehood of 
defendant's representations and of his true 
character, plaintiff severed her relations 
with defendant and has not since cohabited 
with him. Late in 1955, defendant was 
DOUGLASS Col. 6 
P.2d 674 
apprehended by law enforcement officers 
Minnesota, was returned to that state a 
placed in jail. Defendant defaulted and 
default was duly entered. 
Plaintiff testified at the trial to all i 
facts alleged in her complaint. Some thi 
months after the marriage, law enforcerm 
officers appeared at the Douglass hor 
took defendant into custody and caused h 
to be returned to Minnesota. Documents 
evidence was introduced as proof of 1 
Minnesota conviction, parole and revocati 
of parole. The revocation was due to I 
failure of Douglass to support two childi 
by a previous marriage. At the time of t 
trial Douglass was still incarcerated in 
Minnesota jail. Plaintiff testified furtl 
that prior to her marriage defendant r< 
resented that he had "a little girl that v* 
well provided for" whereas, in fact he h 
two children and had not supported the 
The cause was submitted upon the evider 
of plaintiff and the court denied annulme 
Plaintiff appeals. 
[1,2] In denying plaintiff relief t 
court stated: "But I have failed to find a 
California case that supports the deer 
of an annulment in a case such as we ha 
here. In fact, I have found a great ma 
cases to the contrary." We have made 
diligent search of the authorities and ha 
found no case which would serve as 
precedent for denial of a decree of a 
nulment to a plaintiff upon the facts < 
tablished in the present case. The test 
all cases is whether the false represent 
tions or concealment were such as to d 
feat the essential purpose of the injur 
spouse inherent in the contracting of 
marriage. Nothing short of this wou 
justify an annulment; nothing more 
required to establish the voidable cha 
acter of the marriage contract. The fac 
of the decided cases are of infinite variet 
Quite a few of them are listed in Schat 
v. Schaub, 71 Cal.App.2d 467, 162 P.2d 96 
and in Bruce v. Bruce, 71 Cal.App.2d 64 
163 P.2d 95. Millar v. Millar, 175 C< 
797, 167 P. 394, L.R.A.1918B, 415, di 
cusses the subject of annulment at lengt 
The facts of the present case differ mi 
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terially from those of all of the California 
cases involving annulment upon the ground 
of fraud. Such a factual situation is rarely 
to be found in the law books. We venture 
to say that no case is to be found in which 
any court which was free to decree an an-
nulment of a marriage upon the ground of 
fraud has refused a decree to a litigant who 
was shown to be in the unfortunate position 
which Mrs. Douglass occupied at the time 
of her trial. Her right to an annulment is 
to us so clear as to make it wholly un-
necessary for us to concern ourselves with 
the question whether our concept of justice 
has found expression in the decisions of 
other courts. 
[3,4] Section 82 of the Civil Code 
which lists fraud as a ground for annulment 
does not specify the particular frauds 
which will justify the rescission of a con-
tract of marriage, but we do not doubt 
that either party to the marriage has a 
right to a decree of annulment where the 
fraud is so grievous that it places the in-
jured party in a relationship that is in-
tolerable because it cannot honorably be 
endured. "Equity will not deny relief 
where a plan of deceit has been laid out 
and consummated which must inevitably 
defeat the essential purposes of the deceived 
party in entering into the relationship." 
Schaub v. Schaub, supra, 71 Cal.App.2d 
467, 476, 162 P.2d 966, 971. It would serve 
no good purpose to engage in a discourse 
upon the California cases in which various 
frauds have been held either sufficient or 
insufficient to justify a decree of annulment. 
At the time of her marriage to defendant 
Mrs. Douglass had two children by a former 
marriage. There was no reason whatever 
to doubt that in consenting to marry de-
fendant her purposes were such as any 
normal mother of two children would have 
in contracting a second marriage, namely, 
to have a home, a husband of honorable 
character whom she could respect and 
trust, one whom she would be proud to have 
as a companion and to introduce to her 
friends, and who would be a suitable step-
father for her children. These are the 
essentials of the marital relationship which 
plaintiff expected and in all these respects 
her hopes were shattered and her purposes 
defeated. The facts that defendant stood 
convicted of grand theft, as a parole viola-
tor, a fugitive from justice and a father 
guilty of failure to support two children of 
a former marriage were not the only ones 
which blighted plaintiff's future. Even in 
those circumstances the defendant might 
eventually have turned out to be a worthy 
husband, for it is no doubt true that men 
who have served prison terms oftentimes 
prove to be as good husbands as many others 
whose unacquaintance with prison walls 
has been due entirely to their good fortune; 
but the fraud of defendant in concealing 
his criminal record and true character was 
a deceit so gross and cruel as to prove him 
to plaintiff to be a man unworthy of trust, 
either with respect to his truthfulness, his 
moral character or a disposition to be a 
law-abiding citizen. Denial of the prayer 
of plaintiff for annulment would mean that 
when defendant is released from prison she 
must either receive him and extend to him 
the rights and privileges that are usually 
due from a wife, or, rejecting and re-
pulsing him, resign herself to the miserable 
and humiliating existence to which she 
would stand condemned by the fraud of 
the defendant and the court's harsh and 
unsympathetic denial of her plea for libera-
tion. This, in our opinion, would be an 
unjust and intolerable imprisonment to in-
flict upon the innocent plaintiff. We can 
have no part in it. 
The judgment is reversed with instruc-
tions to grant a decree of annulment. 
WOOD and VALLEE, ]]., concur. 
KIPLINOER v. 
Cite as 307 
Fllomena Delgato KIPLINGER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Clark W. KIPLINGER, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Civ. 21730. 
District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 3, California. 
March 1, 1057. 
Action by divorced wife against hus-
band to quiet title to realty, or in the al-
ternative, for partition. The Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, Henry M. Wil-
lis, J., entered judgment that wife owned 
the property as her separate property and 
husband appealed. The District Court of 
Appeal, Parker Wood, J., held that evi-
dence was insufficient to support findings 
that title to property was inadvertently 
placed in names of husband and wife as 
joint tenants, and that it was intent of par-
ties that property be separate property of 
wife, and that husband had no interest in 
the property and that wife was owner of 
the property as her separate property. 
Judgment reversed. 
1. Husband and Wife <S=»I4<3) 
Where deed was to husband and wife 
as joint tenants, there was a presumption 
that title to the property was as described 
in the deed and burden was on wife, who 
sought to establish that property was her 
separate property, to rebut that presump-
tion. 
2. Husband and Wife <S=»I4(3) 
Presumption that title to property was 
as described in a joint tenancy deed, to 
husband and wife, arising from form of the 
deed, could not be rebutted solely by evi-
dence as to source of funds used to pur-
chase the property. 
3. Husband and Wife <£»I4<3), 264 
In action to quiet title to realty, or 
in the alternative for partition, evidence 
was insufficient to support findings that 
title to property was inadvertently placed 
KIPLINGER CaL 6 7 
P.2d 677 
in names of husband and wife as joir 
tenants and that it was intent of partic 
that property be separate property of wif< 
and that husband had no interest in th 
property and that wife was owner of th 
property as her separate property. 
4. Husband and Wife <8=>229(6) 
Where wife's complaint in action t 
quiet title alleged that husband claimed a 
interest in certain realty and that wif 
did not believe that husband had any in 
terest in such realty, and husband, in hi 
answer, denied generally and specificall 
such allegations, but also stated he joine 
wife in request for partition of the realt 
and asked that the realty be sold and pre 
ceeds be distributed equally between th 
parties, even though husband made hi 
denial of interest by general reference t 
the complaint in view of fact that hi 
answer also asserted he claimed an intere; 
in the realty, a triable issue was presente 
as to his claimed interest in the realty. 
Tanner, Thornton & Myers and Joh 
Bricker Myers, Los Angeles, for appellan 
Abe Richman, Los Angeles, for re 
spondent. 
PARKER WOOD, Justice. 
Action to quiet title to real property oi 
in the alternative, for partition. Judgmer 
was that plaintiff owns the property a 
her separate property. Defendant appeal 
from the judgment. 
Appellant contends that the evidenc 
does not support the findings. 
Plaintiff and defendant were married i 
September, 1949. In January, 1950, the 
acquired record title to real propert 
(house and lot) in Encino by a deed whic 
recited that the property was conveye 
to them "as joint tenants." In acquirin 
the property, a down payment of $351.9 
was made, and plaintiff and defendant ex 
ecuted a note and a trust deed for a G. ] 
loan in the amount of $9,500. The unpai 
balance of the loan at the time of trial wa 
$8,337.49. Plaintiff obtained an intei 
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State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 
6100 South Fashion Blvd. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801)265-5500 
September 4, 19 9 0 
Ms. LeslieAnn Glenn 
375 South 100 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010-4901 
Dear LeslieAnn: 
As a iullow up to meeting August 23, 1990, this letter 
is intended to memorialize the issues discussed and officially 
provide notice of the need to terminate your employment with the 
Utah State Department of Corrections as a result of your marriage 
to a parolee under supervision to the Utah Department of 
Corrections (on Inter-State Compact from Alabama). While tl lat 
marriage took place without your knowledge of his criminal 
status, both you and the Department are now cognizant of the 
situation and the Attorney General's office has determined a 
conflict of interest now exists in violation of both Utah Code 
and UDC regulations. The A.G.'s review of the circumstances has 
resulted in a finding from that office that the only viable 
option available to the UDC in light of that relationship is 
termination of the employment relationship. 
M" Is i ny unpleasant responsibility, therefore, to notify you 
that effective September 14, 1990, will terminate your 
employment. It is particularly difficult for me, because your 
performance has been very good; well above the performance levels 
required of the position. The two weeks notice will: 
allow you severance pay for at least a brief time to 
assist you with the transition and to give you some 
time to find another job; .uui 
2, permit Carrie time to debrief you concerning the cases 
you are currently handling. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
'Gary W. DeLand 
Executive Director 
l 
If at some time in the future the current circumstances were 
to change, eliminating the conflict of interest, I would 
certainly be more than happy to entertain your application for 
reemployment with the UDC. As I have explained to you in the 
past, I am very satisfied with the quality of your work. 
Executive Director 




Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Gary W. DeLand 
Executive Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES 
6100 South Fashion Blvd. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801)265-5500 
October 23, 1990 
Ms. LeslieAnn Glenn 
375 South 100 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010-4901 
Dear LeslieAnn: 
This matter has been a difficult and trying one for all 
involved, and needs to be finalized just as quickly as possible. 
That is what I am in the process of attempting to facilitate, 
now. 
By way of summarizing what has happened: 
1. You married Mark Mitchell GLENN, a parolee under felony 
supervision to the state of Alabama. 
2. At some point it was discovered that Mark Glenn was a 
parolee which, of course, you have stated you learned 
about only after you were married. 
3. Your marriage resulted in counsel to the UDC from the 
A.G.'s office that a conflict of interest was created 
as a result of your marriage. 
4. After looking at all the options, ultimately you were 
notified on September 4, 1990, that we would be forced 
to terminate your employment with the Department as of 
September 14, 19 90. 
5. On September 14, 19 90, your divorce from Mark Glenn was 
finalized, resulting in termination of the marriage 
which created the conflict of interest and ended the 
need to end your employment with the UDC. 
As a result of this situation a number of your colleagues in 
the Investigations Bureau and Legal Services Bureau have notified 
Division administrators: 
that they did not believe your explanations; 
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2. that they took exception with some of your actions 
during the time this matter was on-going; 
3. that they wanted a full investigation; and 
4. some said they did not want to work with -you. 
The concerns of these members created a concern about the 
working atmosphere in the Division if you returned and prompted 
inquiries as to the possibility of transferring you to the 
Attorney General's office. At one point, your transfer appeared 
to be assured, but now looks very much in doubt. 
Therefore, it is my intent to return you to work at the UDC 
and to end the current arrangement which has kept your assignment 
away from 6100 South 300 East. I am instructing Nick Morgan to 
assign you to the Legal Services Bureau offices for your work 
station, forthwith, with the following understandings: 
1. Your divorce effectively ends all ties and contact with 
Mark Glenn. Any meetings made necessary as a result of 
the divorce should be cleared with Carrie Hill. 
2. You will have no access to Mark Glenn's offender files. 
3. We will investigate the concerns and allegations raised 
by staff. Obviously, we would go wherever the 
investigation takes us. 
4. We will continue to explore the possibility of 
relocating you to the A.G.'s office if a mutually 
beneficial arrangement can be made. 
Due to the problems which have occurred, I would imagine 
some tension will result when you return. Hopefully, you and 
those you work with can work through any problems and feelings 
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